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Abstract: I analyse how differences between subjective and predicted survival
probabilities are related to preventive healthcare use. Based on the Health and
Retirement Study, I find that private information inherent in subjective survival
probability affects the decisions on preventive care use: positive and negative
deviations between the subjective and predicted survival probabilities both imply
lower likelihood of use, the relations with negative deviations being stronger. These
results are driven by perceptions verified by later survival and health outcomes.
A theoretical model provides explanation for the empirical results, in which pre-
ventive care increases the chances of survival, but the benefits of preventive care
also vary with the survival probability.
Keywords: preventive healthcare, private information, subjective survival probability
JEL codes: D84, I12, J14
1 Introduction
The benefits of preventive care services are widely discussed in the medical
literature, whereas little is known about the influencing mechanism of subjec-
tive survival probability on preventive care use. I analyse this influencing
mechanism both empirically and theoretically. The overall effect of subjective
chances of survival on the demand for preventive services is not trivial. Higher
subjective survival probability can imply higher perceived chances of enjoying
the future benefits of preventive care. At the same time, the perceived marginal
health benefits of prevention might decrease with higher subjective survival
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probability and thus with better health. People with low longevity expectations
might be more desperate to improve their health, thus more willing to use
preventive care. However, they might also decide not to use preventive services
if they have low chances of survival anyway.
I use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to estimate the impact of
subjective survival expectations on the use of flu vaccination, mammogram, PAP
(Papanicolaou) smear, and prostate screening. I focus on expected survival relative
to predicted survival probability and estimate the effects of deviations between
subjective and predicted survival probabilities on preventive care use. Predicted
survival probabilities are based on estimated models of observed survival.
Differences between subjective and predictive survivals can stem from biased
perceptions, measurement errors, but also from private information. In the rest of
the paper I use the term “private information” when I refer to the part of the
subjective survival probability which is not due to measurement error but cannot
be predicted based on observable characteristics, hence which generally cannot be
taken into account when recommendations on preventive care use are made.
Distinguishing between positive and negative perceptions allows me to investigate
the non-linearities in how subjective survival probability and the private informa-
tion inherent in these expectations affect preventive care use.
The results indicate that private information inherent in the subjective
survival probability affects the decisions on preventive care use, but I find no
clear evidence that the use of preventive care is driven by survival perceptions
unjustified by later health or survival outcomes. These findings suggest that
people use their subjective expectations when they make decisions on preven-
tive care use. When designing and evaluating policies aimed at higher uptake of
preventive services, policy makers should take into account that attendance is
influenced by private longevity perceptions. Attendance might not be optimal
for those who have private information on shorter or longer longevity chances
than the population average. Healthcare professionals can provide information
about factors affecting the chances of survival (such as the effects of health
behaviours and the consequences of certain medical conditions). In turn, correct
information can ensure that preventive care use decisions are based on accurate
evaluations of the survival probability.
The findings of this paper can enhance our understanding of the demand for
preventive care among individuals aged 50 and above. The study also contri-
butes to the usage of survey data on expectations in empirical models of
individual choices, corresponding to the recommendations of Manski (2004).
The empirical analysis is supported by a model of preventive care demand with
uncertain lifetime, which takes into account the mutual relationship between
survival probability and preventive care use.
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This paper is related to the literature that uses data on subjective survival as
an explanatory factor of individual decisions. Although the accuracy of beliefs
about subjective survival has been analysed previously (Bago d’Uva et al. 2015;
Elder 2013; Hurd and McGarry 1995; Smith, Taylor, and Sloan 2001, among
others), looking at the deviations between subjective and predicted survival
probabilities in an empirical model of healthcare decisions is a novelty. Bloom
et al. (2006) analyse how expected longevity affects retirement decisions and
wealth accumulation. Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos (2004) estimate the effect
of subjective survival probabilities on retirement and on the claiming of social
security benefits. Gan et al. (2015) and Salm (2010) focus on consumption and
saving decisions and on bequest motives and how these are affected by sub-
jective mortality expectations. Bíró (2013) estimates the effect of shocks to
subjective mortality on consumption expenditures. Fang et al. (2007) look at
health investments in relation to subjective longevity, but instead of preventive
care use, they focus on smoking, heavy drinking and high BMI. The cited
authors generally find that economic decisions are driven by subjective survival
probabilities, and using subjective longevity instead of life table data increases
the explanatory power of the models.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to analyse how deviations between
subjective and predicted survival probabilities, and in particular, the private
information inherent in subjective survival probabilities influence preventive
care decisions. This can be considered as an extension of Picone, Sloan, and
Taylor (2004), who estimate positive effects of subjective longevity on the
attendance of cancer screening, based on the first three waves of the HRS
data. They generate an indicator of expected subjective longevity based on
survey responses to survival probability, and address the endogeneity of long-
evity in models of preventive care use (due to reverse causality) with including a
measure of time preference in their regressions. Picone et al. also focus on the
role of risk and time preference apart from expected longevity. I contribute to
their empirical analysis by focusing on the deviations between subjective and
predicted survival probabilities, analysing the use of more types of preventive
services, and using later waves of the HRS data. As a further extension, I analyse
if justified and unjustified survival expectations according to survival and health
outcomes have different relations to preventive care use. I can thus investigate
non-linear relations between preventive care use and probabilities of survival,
and can elicit the role of private information on the chances of survival when
decisions on preventive care use are made.
While there are limited results in the literature on the effects of subjective
life expectancy on preventive care use, there are more studies which analyse
how ageing and the closeness to death is related to preventive care and more
Differences between Subjective and Predicted Survival Probabilities 3
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generally to healthcare use (Zweifel, Felder, and Meiers 1999; Yang, Norton, and
Stearns 2003, among others). Other authors look at the relation between pre-
ventive care use and health. For example, Wu (2003) finds that people in poor
health are less likely to attend cancer screening, which he explains by psycho-
logical factors such as fear and anxiety. This result is in line with the theoretical
model of Kȍszegi (2003), who shows that anxiety can lead to avoiding doctoral
visits or health-related information, but against the recent results of Carman and
Kooreman (2014) who report that the perception of more risk makes individuals
more likely to use prevention.
The results of Picone et al. (2004) and Wu (2003) suggest that the expected
effect of subjective survival probability on preventive care use should be
positive. The theoretical model I present in Section 4 reveals that this relation
holds only under some specific assumptions. Also, the empirical results of the
paper provide mixed evidence, most of the results indicating non-monotonic
relations.
The theoretical model of Section 4 is, to my knowledge, the first attempt to
explicitly model and analyse the influencing mechanism of subjective survival
probability on preventive care use. The model explains how both positive and
negative survival perceptions might lead to lower demand for preventive care. A
related model is of Picone et al. (2004), deriving a positive effect of longer life
expectancy on the probability of attending a cancer screening. However, they
consider only the health aspect of expected longevity, they do not model its
interaction with the discount rate. I allow the probability of illness and the
efficiency of preventive care to vary with the initial probability of survival.
I also take into account that while the costs of the prevention are realised in
the present, the benefits are realised in the future, which realisation is again
conditional on the probability of survival. These extensions lead to different
conclusions on the relations between life expectancy and preventive care use
than what Picone et al. (2004) find, showing that the relations might be non-
monotonic. Another related model is of Balia and Jones (2008), although Balia
and Jones focus on the mortality effects of health behaviours, whereas my focus
is on the effect of expected survival on the demand for preventive care. Fang
et al. (2007) also briefly outline a model that can provide explanation for the so-
called Mickey Mantle effect, where greater life expectancy increases investment
in health.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 I introduce the
data and discuss how the indicators of positive and negative perceptions in
terms of survival probability are generated. Section 3 is devoted to the empirical
analysis, and a model of preventive care use with mortality risk is presented in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data
I use data from the RAND HRS data collection,1 version N. This data set is a
collection of cleaned and processed variables from the original HRS, which is a
US-based panel survey of individuals over age 50 and their spouses. The survey
started in 1992 and is repeated every second year. I use data on individuals aged
50 and above from waves 1–11, spanning years 1992–2012.
I focus on four different binary outcome variables, as summarised in Table 1.
These indicators refer to preventive care use since the last survey wave, and are
asked only from wave 3 on. Every even numbered wave in the preventive care use
questions is skipped for individuals who responded in the previous wave. The PAP
smear and breast screening questions are asked only of female respondents, pros-
tate screening is asked only of male respondents. Although the HRS data also
provide information on cholesterol checks, I do not analyse these because of the
low recommended frequency of cholesterol checks (5 years). Reporting no choles-
terol checks in a given survey wave could be due to an attendance within the past 5
year, rendering it difficult to draw behavioural consequences from the observations.
The analysed service types have different costs and health insurance coverage.
Without insurance, according to the information provided by CostHelper.com
(2015), the current cost of a flu shot is around $5–30, mammogram is $80–120,
PAP test is $25–60, and prostate screening is $15–250 in case of a digital rectal exam
and $20–120 in case of a prostate-specific antigen test. The insurance coverage
changes throughout time. Before the 2010 Affordable Care Act, private health
insurance contracts typically provided partial coverage for the costs of flu vaccina-
tion and cancer screenings. Medicare Part B also provides annual (bi-annual for
PAP test) coverage for the analysed preventive services, although the coverage is
1 The HRS (Health and Retirement Study) is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging (grant
number NIA U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan. The RAND HRS
Data file was developed at RAND with funding from the National Institute on Aging and the
Social Security Administration.
Table 1: Preventive care use in the pooled sample.
Usage rate Observations
Flu shot (aged + ) . ,
Mammogram or X-ray of the breast (women only, aged + ) . ,
PAP smear (women only, aged –) . ,
Prostate screening (men only, aged + ) . ,
Differences between Subjective and Predicted Survival Probabilities 5
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only partial (80%) if the prostate cancer test is performed with a digital rectal exam.
The Medicaid coverage of preventive services varies by states.
Several agencies provide guidelines of preventive care use (e. g. the United States
Preventive Services Task Force, the American Cancer Society, or the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention). Generally speaking, the recommended frequency
is annual for flu shot and prostate screening, and it is 1–3 years for breast screening
and PAP smear. The recommended age categories are universal for flu shots, 40+ for
breast screening, 20–65 for PAP smear, and 50+ for prostate screening.
The subjective survival probabilitymeasures are based on self-reported survival
probabilities to given ages. The question asked is “What is the percent chance that
you will live to be age (target age) or more?” The target age varies across the survey
waves; it is either age 75, 85, or depends on the current age of the respondent. The
age-specific target age is 10–15 years plus the current age. I use the reported survival
probability up to the age-specific target age as the basic indicator of subjective
survival. If this is missing and the respondent is aged at most 70, or if the survival
probability up to age 85 is also missing then I use the survival probability up to age
75. Otherwise I use the subjective survival up to age 85. Based on the selected
reported survival probability I generate a k-year subjective survival probability
measure, following the hazard scaling approach of Gan, Hurd, and McFadden
(2005). This procedure ensures that the survival probability measure I use refers
to the same time horizon across all observations. As the first step I calculate the
individual specific index of pessimism (η) which is the ratio between the logarithm
of the reported survival probability (s) and the life table survival probability (S) from
the current age (t) to the target age (t + a):
ηi =
ln st + ait
ln St + at
.
I use the gender-specific period life table for year 2000 as provided by the Social
Security Administration (Bell and Miller 2005). If s = 0 then the reported zero
probability is replaced with 1% survival probability to ensure that the index of
pessimism is not missing for these respondents.2 The k-year subjective survival
probability is then calculated as
st + kit = S
t + k
t
 ηi .
2 Similar replacement procedures are applied by Khwaja, Sloan, and Chung (2007) and Salm
(2010). The conclusions of the paper still hold if the s=0 observations are omitted – the main
results are qualitatively robust. The results of the paper are also robust to the exclusion of
respondents aged 80 and above, for whom there are on average larger discrepancies between
the subjective and life table survival probabilities (Figure 1).
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Figure 1 shows that the mean and the median of the so generated subjective 10-
year survival probability fit relatively well on the life table survival probability,
although the dispersion increases at older ages. The oldest are also more likely
to overestimate their chances of survival as compared to the life table probabil-
ities, although the deviations can partly be due to selectivity in answering the
survival probability survey question. Hurd and McGarry (1995) and Smith et al.
(2001) show that the subjective probabilities of survival are not only comparable
to population averages of survival but also vary with observable characteristics
the similar way as actual outcomes do.3
The subjective survival probabilities can also be compared to the observed
survival probabilities in the sample as the HRS data include information if the
attrition from the sample was due to death. In Figure 1 I also present the age-
specific observed survival rates (“mean, actual”), which are in line with the life
table survival probabilities.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics of the survival probability indi-
cators and the rest of the variables used in the empirical analysis. These
statistics refer to the pooled 50 + sample of waves 1–11.
While η nets the survival probability only from the gender-specific life table
survival probability, I generate the indicators of positive and negative perceptions
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
50 60 70 80 90 100
age
mean, subjective median, subjective
mean, life table mean, actual
25th percentile, subjective 75th percentile, subjective
Figure 1: Subjective, life table and actual 10-year survival probabilities (%).
3 Using the 10-year survival probability as a single indicator of subjective chances of survival is
a data-driven simplification. In principle, the whole distribution of survival probabilities influ-
ences the preventive care decisions.
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by netting out the effects of other observable characteristics as well. The aim is to
arrive at a measure that captures that part of the survival expectation which does
not follow from other observed characteristics, and which is generally known only
to the individual and not to other parties (policy makers) who might make recom-
mendations on preventive care use. First, I estimate gender-specific probit models
of the actual 10-year survival, including age, age squared, race, logarithmic income,
education level, having children, marital status, employment status, indicator of
being a smoker ever, subjective and objective health indicators, health insurance
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, pooled sample.
Mean Std.
Dev.
Subjective survival probability . .
Predicted survival probability . .
Positive survival perceptions (if not zero) . .
Negative survival perceptions (if not zero) . .
Female . .
College or higher education . .
Total annual household income (thousand USD) . .
Age . .
White/Caucasian . .
Black/African American . .
Has child . .
Widowed . .
Single . .
Retired (employment status is retired only) . .
Smoked ever . .
Any ADL limitations (difficulties with bathing, eating, dressing, walking
across a room, getting in or out of bed)
. .
Ever had cancer . .
Ever had diabetes . .
Ever had high blood pressure . .
Ever had heart problems . .
Ever had lung disease . .
Ever had stroke . .
Hospital stay, previous  years ( = yes/ = no) . .
Nursing home stay, previous  years ( = yes/ = no) . .
Subjective health (from  = excellent to  = poor) . .
Covered by Federal Government health insurance . .
Covered by health insurance from current or previous employer . .
Mother alive . .
Father alive . .
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coverage, and indicators of whether the parents are alive as regressors. If non-
missing, I also include binary indicators of flu vaccination, mammography, PAP
smear and prostate screening from the last two survey waves. The estimated
marginal effects are presented in the online Appendix. Then I predict based on
these models the 10-year survival probability.4 Figure 2 shows the histogram of the
difference between the subjective and predicted 10-year survival probability (called
as net indicator henceforth) – this is centred around zero, reflecting that on average
the subjective probabilities correspond to the predicted ones.
In the empirical specifications I disentangle the effects of positive and negative
perceptions on preventive care use. The measure of positive perceptions equals
the above generated net indicator if that is positive and is zero otherwise. The
measure of negative perceptions equals the minus of the net indicator if that is
negative, zero otherwise.
0
1
2
3
D
en
si
ty
–1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
Figure 2: Histogram of the difference between the subjective and predicted 10-year survival
probabilities.
4 Although the probit models of survival necessarily exclude the observations of the last 5
waves, the predicted probabilities still can be generated for the whole sample, assuming that
the parameters of the survival models remain unchanged across survey waves. The estimated
probit models of survival fit the data well. The percentage correctly predicted ranges between
79% and 83%, and the area under ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curve ranges between
84.3% and 87.6%.
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The difference between the subjective and predicted survival probabilities
can be due to misperception of the true survival probability (including measure-
ment errors), or due to private information related to factors affecting the
chances of survival. I return to the analysis of the sources of difference in
Section 3.2.2.
The set of graphs presented in Figure 3 illustrates how preventive care use is
related to the lagged 10-year survival probability, and to its difference from the
predicted survival probability. The graphs present the predicted usage probabil-
ities from estimations of local polynomials along with the 95% confidence
interval.5 As other confounding factors are not controlled for, these graphs
cannot reveal causal relations. The graphs indicate that subjective survival
probability is positively related to the uptake of mammogram and PAP smear,
and negatively to flu shots. The relation of the preventive care use probabilities
to the subjective survival probability is different from the relation to the net
indicator. Individuals with the most positive and most negative perceptions are
the least likely to attend cancer screening, although the confidence intervals
indicate large uncertainties. If nonzero values of the net indicator indicate
private information then the graphs suggest that both positive and negative
private information related to survival are associated with lower likelihoods of
attending cancer screening. I investigate these non-monotonic relations further
in the following empirical and theoretical analyses.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Main Results
I estimate models of preventive care use, using as main regressors the indicators
of positive and negative perceptions as introduced in Section 2. I consider
preventive care use to be decided by the patient. Even if physicians have
influence through recommending preventive care use (as shown e. g. by
Macinko, Starfield, and Shi 2007), the final decision on the uptake of a pre-
ventive service is made by the patient. I estimate pooled probit models with
robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. In order to avoid omitted
variable bias and to capture time trends in preventive care use, I control for a
5 The graphs were prepared with the twoway Ipolyci command of Stata 13.1, using the default
options.
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Figure 3: Relation of the subjective survival probability (left panel) and the subjective
minus predicted survival probability (right panel) to preventive care use: local polynomial
estimator and 95 percentage confidence interval (y-axis: probability of use; x-axis, left
panel: survival probability; x-axis, right panel: difference between subjective and predicted
survival probability).
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rich set of individual specific characteristics in addition to survey wave dummies
(as displayed in Table 3).6 The control variables ensure that the estimated effects
of positive and negative perceptions do not capture the indirect effects of other
observable characteristics such as age or education.7 Each dependent variable is
Table 3: Average marginal effects based on pooled probit models of preventive care use.
Flu shot Mammogram Prostate screening PAP Smear
Positive perceptions –.** . −. −.
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Negative perceptions –.*** −.*** −.*** −.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Female .***
[.]
Black/African
American
−.*** .*** .*** .***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Other race −. –. −.*** .**
[.] [.] [.] [.]
College or higher
education
.*** .*** .*** .***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
ln(income) .*** .*** .*** .***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Age .*** .*** .*** −.
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Age squared –.e-*** –.*** –.*** .
[.e-] [.e-] [.e-] [.]
Widowed −.*** −.*** −.*** −.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Single −.*** −.*** −.*** −.***
(continued )
6 The set of included regressors is the same as in the probit models of survival (Section 2),
except for the exclusion of parental longevity (capturing inherited traits of longevity in the
survival models), subjective health and past preventive care use (omitted to avoid endogeneity
bias). Since for most of the respondents preventive care usage is recorded only in the odd
numbered waves, I include only four wave dummies in the models. These can capture time
effects on preventive care use between waves 4–5, 6–7, 8–9 and 10–11 (with waves 2–3 as the
reference category).
7 The decision on preventive care use is supposed to be influenced by the subjective expectations,
therefore the predicted survival probability is not included in the model as a separate regressor. The
included controls can capture the relation between the predicted survival probability and preven-
tive care use. Nevertheless, the statistically significant marginal effects of negative perceptions are
robust to the inclusion of the predicted survival probability in the model.
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Table 3: (continued )
Flu shot Mammogram Prostate screening PAP Smear
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Has child −.*** .** .** .
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Retired .*** .*** .*** .**
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Smoked ever . −.*** −.*** −.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Any ADL limitations .*** −.*** −. −.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Ever had cancer .*** .*** .*** .*
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Ever had high blood
pressure
.*** .*** .*** .*
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Ever had lung
disease
.*** −.*** .*** −.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Ever had diabetes .*** −. .*** −.**
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Ever had heart
problems
.*** −. .** −.*
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Ever had stroke . −.*** −.*** −.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Hospital stay, past 
years
.*** .*** .*** .
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Nursing home stay,
past  years
. −.** −.*** −.
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Federal Government
health insurance
.*** .*** .*** .***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Health insurance
from employer
.*** .*** .*** .***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Wave  .*** .*** .*** .***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Wave  .*** . . .
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Wave  .*** . −.* −.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Wave  .*** −.*** −.*** −.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Observations , , , ,
Note: Clustered bootstrap standard errors in brackets, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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timed one survey wave ahead of the regressors because the reported preventive
care use refers to the period since the last interview. This feature of the data also
mitigates the problem of reverse causality from the outcome variable to the
indicators of positive and negative perceptions. The estimation sample of PAP
test is restricted to women aged 50–65. Otherwise the sample covers individuals
aged 50 and above.
Is it possible to give causal interpretation to the estimation results? Below
I argue that although endogeneity might be present, it is less of a concern in
the estimated models than in a specification where subjective survival prob-
ability would enter as regressor. Unobserved factors related both to the
indicators of positive and negative perceptions and to preventive care use
can bias the estimates. Positive attitudes towards preventive care might bias
the estimated effect of positive perceptions upwards and negative perceptions
downwards, whereas if the usage is triggered by unobserved health problems
then the bias is more likely to be in the other direction.8 Although the
empirical strategy I apply can completely eliminate endogeneity only under
some strong assumptions, the estimation results are still informative on how
preventive care use relates to private information inherent in subjective sur-
vival probabilities.
Using the generated indicators of positive and negative perceptions can
mitigate the problem of endogeneity. I present this argument in the framework
of index function models. Let y denote the binary indicator of preventive care
use, St + 5*it the subjective survival probability to wave t+ 5 (i. e. 10-year ahead),
and X the vector of other control variables. Index t refers to time (survey wave),
and i to the individual. The probit model with subjective survival probability as
regressor is:
8 The endogeneity problems could be mitigated by the estimation of fixed effects models, but
data limitations make it difficult to identify the effects of shocks to subjective survival prob-
ability. Preventive care use is observed only every four years starting from wave 3. In addition,
there is relatively strong persistency in preventive care use. The autocorrelation between the 3rd
and 5th wave preventive care use is between 0.34 – 0.54, being the weakest for prostate
screening and the strongest for influenza vaccination.
In a related empirical setting, Fang et al. (2007) use the longevity of parents as instrumental
variables. The main drawback of using these instruments in the current application is that the
early death of a parent can have direct effect on preventive care use, especially if the death was
flu related or due to cancer. In addition, indicators of parents’ longevity are weak instruments in
the current setting.
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y*it = α0 + α1s
t + 5
it +Xitα2 + uit, [1]
Pr yit = 1ð Þ=Φ α0 + a1st + 5it +Xitα2
 
, [2]
where y* is a latent variable, and Ф (.) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. Endogeneity can arise from the nonzero correlation
between s and u, e. g. due to the joint relation to past preventive care use or
to unobserved health behaviours, such as eating habits and physical activity.
The net indicator ~s is generated based on the observed survival S (which is 0 or
1) and observable characteristics Z, where Z is a subset of X. Again, using the
index function framework:
St + 5*it = β0 + β1yit − 1 +Zitβ2 + vit, [3]
Pr St + 5it = 1
 
=Φ β0 + β1yit − 1 +Zitβ2ð Þ, [4]
~sit = st + 5it − Pr
dSt + 5it = 1
 
. [5]
The regressors included in the probit model of observed survival (eq. [4]) are
listed in Section 2. The indicators of positive ð~sposÞ and negative ð~snegÞ percep-
tions that I use in the empirical analysis are nonlinear functions of
~s: ~sposit =~sit  I ~sit > 0ð Þ; ~snegit = −~sit  I ~sit < 0ð Þ, where I (.) is the indicator function.
The estimated model is:
y*it = γ0 + γ1s
~pos
it + γ2s
~neg
it +Xitγ3 +wit, [6]
Pr yit = 1ð Þ=Φ γ0 + γ1s~posit + γ2s~negit +Xitγ3
 
. [7]
If s is endogenous in eq. [1] then the variables ~spos and ~sneg can still be correlated
with the error term w, but only if that part of the subjective survival probability
is correlated with w which cannot be explained by the observable characteris-
tics, i. e. if s
~
and w are correlated. If, for example, in eq. [1] the sole reason of
endogeneity is the omitted influence of past preventive care use, and if the
influence of past preventive care use is perfectly netted out in eq. [5] due to an
identical effect both on the subjective and predicted survival probabilities, then
this source of endogeneity is no longer present in eq. [6]. The issue of reverse
causality arises in eq. [6]: preventive care use can influence ~sposand ~sneg through
its effect on the 5-wave survival S.9 However, the actual survival of a respondent
enters into the model only indirectly, through the derivation of the predicted
9 Direct simultaneity bias is not a concern in the estimated models because preventive care use
refers to the two-year period after the subjective survival probability was measured.
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survival probability indicator (eqs [3] and [4]). Therefore the possible bias
caused by reverse causality is negligible.
I present in Table 3 the estimated average marginal effects of eq. [7].10
The results indicate that apart from the negative effect of positive perceptions
on the uptake of flu shot, positive survival perceptions do not have statisti-
cally significant effect on the probability of preventive care use. Positive
perceptions might decrease the use of preventive care (as is the case for flu
shots) because the health and longevity benefits of prevention are lower if
someone has private information about factors implying high probability of
survival regardless of preventive care use. The results also show that negative
perceptions imply significantly lower likelihood of getting a flu jab and
attending the three types of cancer screening. If the subjective 10-year survi-
val probability is 10 percentage points lower than the predicted one then that
implies 0.42–0.81 percentage points lower probability of preventive care use,
ceteris paribus. An explanation can be that an individual perceives a lower
chance to enjoy the future benefits of prevention if she has private informa-
tion about factors that decrease her probability of survival. I return to the
underlying mechanisms in Section 4. The nonparametric graphs of Figure 3
already suggested the negative relation between negative perceptions and
preventive care use, but could not reveal that this relation is significant and
stronger than the relation between positive perceptions and preventive
care use.
3.2 Specification Checks
I check the robustness of the results presented in Table 3 and make some
extensions to enhance the understanding of the main results. In all specifica-
tions I include the same set of control variables as before.
3.2.1 Modified Measures of Positive and Negative Perceptions
First, instead of using the continuous indicators of positive and negative percep-
tions, I use binary indicators. I define here an individual as having positive
10 The average marginal effects were calculated with the margins command of Stata 13.1. The
bootstrap standard errors take into account that the indicators of positive and negative perceptions
are based on a first stage estimate. 1000 replications were used in the bootstrapping procedure.
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perceptions if the difference between the subjective and predicted survival
probability is larger than 0.1 (26% of the respondents with non missing survival
probability), and negative perceptions if the same difference is smaller than –0.1
(32% of the respondents with non missing survival probability). Using binary
indicators can reduce the noisiness of the regressors of main interest. Apart from
flu shots, the results reinforce the negative relation between negative percep-
tions and preventive care use: people with negative perceptions are 1.6–2.7
percentage points less likely to attend cancer screening, ceteris paribus. The
results also indicate that having positive perceptions implies 0.3–1 percentage
point lower probability of getting a flu jab or attending prostate screening,
although these results are statistically insignificant. I present the marginal
effects of interest in the first part of Table 4.11
Table 4: Modified measures of positive and negative perceptions: average marginal effects
based on pooled probit models of preventive care use.
Flu shot Mammogram Prostate
screening
PAP smear
Binary indicators of
perceptions
Positive perceptions (/) −. . −. .
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Negative perceptions (/) . −.*** −.** −.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Observations , , , ,
-year outcomes
Positive perceptions −.** −. −. −.
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Negative perceptions −.*** −.*** −.*** −.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Observations , , , ,
All specifications
Individual specific controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Wave dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Note: Clustered bootstrap standard errors in brackets, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
11 The results are qualitatively robust to using cutoffs of ± 0.2 or ± 0.3. With the higher cutoff
values some of the estimated effects become slightly stronger.
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In the second specification check I return to the continuous measures of
positive and negative perceptions, but consider 6-year outcomes instead of the
original 10-year outcomes when generating the indicators of positive and nega-
tive perceptions. The main benefit of this alternative specification is that the size
of the estimation sample increases in the underlying probit models of survival
probability. On the other hand, fewer death cases are observed within a 6-year
interval. Under this specification the estimated effects of positive and negative
perceptions are expected to increase in absolute value because 6-year survival
probabilities vary less than the 10-year probabilities. For example, a 10 percen-
tage points deviation in the 6-year survival probability implies stronger private
information on survival than the same magnitude of deviation in the 10-year
survival probability. The results presented in the second part of Table 4 confirm
this expectation: the estimated effects of both the positive and negative percep-
tions are negative under this specification, and the magnitudes of the significant
marginal effects of positive and negative perceptions increase.
3.2.2 Justified versus Unjustified Perceptions
To disentangle the effect of misperception and private information related to
survival probability on preventive care use I generate indicators of unjustified and
justified positive and negative perceptions. I define the binary indicators of positive
and negative perceptions the same way as in Section 3.2.1. Among people with
positive perceptions those are defined to have unjustified perceptions who report a
new diagnosis of heart problem, stroke, or die during the following 10 years.
Otherwise the individual is categorised as having justified positive perceptions.12
Analogously, an individual with negative perceptions is defined to have unjustified
perceptions if she or he is alive 10 years later, and has not been newly diagnosed
with heart problem or stroke. Otherwise the individual is categorised as having
justified negative perceptions. Justified perceptions can be considered as private
information about survival, where “private“ informationmeans it cannot be derived
from the other observable characteristics. By definition, unjustified and justified
survival probabilities cannot be told apart in the last five waves of the HRS. One
could argue that the categorisation should be based on the observed survival only
since the reported probability refers to the chances of survival. The problem with
12 The terminology is simplified here. Unjustified over- and underestimation of the survival
probability can partly be due to misperception, but also due to the random nature of health and
survival outcomes. Thus part of the people with “ unjustified” positive perceptions might in fact
be “unlucky”.
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this alternative approach, which I check below, is that the actual survival prob-
ability cannot be observed, only the actual survival or death. To mitigate this
problem, I take into account the occurrence of two chronic health conditions
along with the observed survival. The conditions of heart problems and stroke are
selected because those are strong predictors of actual survival, and their diagnosis
is not likely to be influenced by the utilisation of the analysed preventive care
services.13
I present in Table 5 the distribution of respondents across the categories and the
group-specific average survival probabilities. Pooled linear probability models
reveal that men, ever smokers, those reporting some health problems, black respon-
dents, older, widowed or single individuals are more likely to have unjustified
positive perceptions, whereas the same characteristics decrease the probability of
having unjustified negative perceptions. Biases in subjective survival probabilities
in the HRS are also assessed by Elder (2013). Using data from the HRS, in a recent
working paper Bago d’Uva et al. (2015) report that individuals with lower levels of
education or cognitive abilities are less likely to report accurate survival probabil-
ities, where accuracy is based on observed mortality.
13 This might not be true for diagnosis with cancer, since (early) diagnosis is more likely if
someone attends the screening programmes. This could imply reverse causality in the estimated
models.
Table 5: Indicators of positive and negative perceptions, respondents aged 50+ .
Within group mean of -year
survival probability (%)
% of respondents Subjective Predicted
Positive perceptions (/) . . .
Negative perceptions (/) . . .
Neither positive, nor
negative perceptions
. . .
Justified positive
perceptions (/)
.* . .
Justified negative
perceptions (/)
.* . .
Unjustified positive
perceptions (/)
.* . .
Unjustified negative
perceptions (/)
.* . .
Note: *% of those with non-missing 10-year ahead indicators.
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The results presented in the first part of Table 6 indicate that apart from the
weakly significant negative effect of unjustified positive perceptions on prostate
screening and PAP test attendance, unjustified perception of the survival probability
does not have statistically significant effect on the probability of preventive care use.
On the other hand, justified negative perceptions imply more than 3.5 percentage
points lower likelihood of attending the three types of cancer screening, and these
estimates are statistically significant. The small and insignificant estimated effects of
unjustified negative perceptions suggest that unjustified expectations (at least in case
of negative perceptions) are due to measurement error rather than to strong sub-
jective beliefs on the chances of survival.
Table 6: Justified versus unjustified perceptions: average marginal effects based on pooled
probit models of preventive care use.
Flu shot Mammogram Prostate
screening
PAP smear
Justified positive perceptions (/) –. . –. .
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Justified negative perceptions (/) –. –.*** –.*** –.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Unjustified positive perceptions (/) –. –. –.* –.*
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Unjustified negative perceptions (/) . –. –. –.
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Observations , , , ,
Positive and negative perceptions
based on survival only
Justified Positive perceptions (/) –. . –. –.
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Justified negative perceptions (/) –. –.*** –.*** –.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Unjustified positive perceptions (/) –. –.** –.** –.*
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Unjustified negative perceptions (/) . –. –. –.**
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Observations , , , ,
All specifications
Individual specific controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Wave dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Note: Clustered bootstrap standard errors in brackets, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Next, I differentiate justified and unjustified survival perceptions based only
on the observed 10-year survival. For example, those are categorised to have
unjustified negative perceptions for whom the generated binary indicator of
negative perceptions equals one, but who are alive 10 years after. The estimated
negative effect of justified negative perceptions in the models of cancer screen-
ing is bigger than before, their estimated effect on flu vaccinations also increases
in magnitude but is still statistically insignificant. In addition, using 5% sig-
nificance level, unjustified negative perceptions are estimated to be significantly
negatively related to attending a PAP test. The reason for these changes in the
results is that the category of justified negative perceptions is narrower than
before – only those are categorised as such who are not alive 10 years after. The
results indicate that people with negative perceptions who die within 10 years
are ceteris paribus less likely to use preventive care than those who also have
negative perceptions, are diagnosed with some health problems within 10 years,
but survive. In addition, the (weakly) significant negative marginal effects of
unjustified positive perceptions indicate that those who severely overestimate
their chances of survival are less likely to use preventive services, implying
irrational underutilisation.
3.2.3 Subjective Survival Probability as Regressor
In the baseline empirical specification of Section 3.1, the regressors of central
interest are the positive and negative differences between the subjective and
predicted survival probabilities. The main benefits of that specification are that
positive and negative perceptions are allowed to have different relations to
preventive care use, endogeneity concerns are mitigated, and inferences can
be made how private perceptions on survival probability affect preventive care
use. The aim of the following two specification checks is to provide further
insights to the mechanisms driving the baseline results.
First, instead of the measures of positive and negative perceptions, I include
the subjective 10-year survival probability as a regressor in the models of
preventive care use. The estimated marginal effects of interest are reported in
Table 7, indicating that higher subjective survival probability implies higher
probability of cancer screening. This finding is in line with the results of
Picone et al. (2004). Setting aside the endogeneity issues, the positive relation
might be driven by higher marginal benefits of cancer screening. However, these
results cannot reveal to what extent these differences are driven by subjective
beliefs as opposed to objective survival probabilities. Also, these results cannot
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capture the non-monotonic relations that the baseline specifications reveal. To
investigate non-monotonicities, I re-estimate the models with estimating differ-
ent coefficients for the five quintiles of the 10-year subjective survival probability
in the probit models of preventive care use. The average marginal effects are
presented in the second part of Table 7. This extension shows that while higher
subjective survival probability generally implies higher probability of preventive
care use for all the analysed preventive services, these relations turn to the
negative at the top quintile of the survival probability distribution (subjective
survival probabilities above 0.96). This is in line with the baseline results and
with the predictions of the theoretical model of Section 4: both having very low
and very high subjective chances of survival can imply lower demand for
preventive care.
Table 7: Average marginal effects of subjective 10-year survival probability based on pooled
probit models of preventive care use.
Flu shot Mammogram Prostate screening PAP smear
-year subjective survival
probability (range: –)
. .*** .*** .***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Observations , , , ,
Effects by quintiles of
-year survival
probability
Quintile  (–.) .* .*** .** .
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Quintile  (.–.) . –. . –.
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Quintile  (.–.) –. .*** . .**
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Quintile  (.–.) . .** .** .***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Quintile  (.–) –.*** –.*** –.*** –.***
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Observations , , , ,
All specifications
Individual specific controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Wave dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Clustered standard errors in brackets, *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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The results get close to the baseline results if I use the positive and negative
differences between the subjective and gender specific life table survival prob-
abilities as regressors. I use here the same life table survival probabilities as in
Section 2. Table 8 shows the estimated marginal effects, which are slightly
bigger in absolute value than the baseline results. On the one hand, these
differences suggest that the objective elements of subjective survival expecta-
tions (which are netted out in the baseline specification but not here) have the
same sign of relation towards preventive care use as the subjective elements
have. On the other hand, the qualitative similarity of the results to the baseline
indicates that the included control variables do a good job in capturing not only
the direct effects of observable characteristics but also the indirect effects which
work through the predicted survival probability.
4 Model of Preventive Care Use
I present an illustrative model that can capture the relation between subjective
survival probability and preventive care use. The aim is to enhance our under-
standing of the complex relations between subjective survival probability and
preventive care use, and to relate the empirical findings to the predictions of the
theoretical model. The model builds on the Grossman-type models of healthcare
demand (Grossman 1972), as preventive care use is considered as an investment
in health. The main contributions of the current model are that health and
survival probability depend on preventive care use, while at the same time the
efficiency of preventive care also depends on survival probability (and health).
Table 8: Differences from life table survival probability: average marginal effects based on
pooled probit models of preventive care use.
Flu shot Mammogram Prostate
screening
PAP
smear
Indicators based on subjective and life
table –year survival probabilities
Positive perceptions –.*** . –. .
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Negative perceptions –.*** –.*** –.*** –.**
[.] [.] [.] [.]
Observations , , , ,
Individual specific controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Wave dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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I assume that individuals maximise their expected utility based on their
subjective survival probability. Subjective survival probability (s) equals
the predicted (objective) survival probability plus a deviation between the
two: s = spredicted + s
~
. Positive and negative perceptions in terms of survival
probability as analysed in Section 3.1 (positive and negative s
~
) have the same
effect in this modelling framework as having higher or lower initial survival
probability.
There are two periods. The decision on preventive care use (M) is a
dichotomous decision made in period one, and the benefits in terms of health
and survival are enjoyed in period two. Preventive services can have three
beneficial effects: first, to increase the survival probability, second, to decrease
the probability of getting the disease, and third, to mitigate the second period
health effects of the disease. I do not consider the potential fourth benefit of
decreasing the uncertainty related to second period health. The survival prob-
ability is s + ξ M (I assume that max (s) + ξ ≤ 1), initial health is θs.
The probability of getting the disease is π0–(π1–π 2s) M with π 0 ≥ π1 ≥ π2 ≥
0, and the second period health in case of getting the disease is βθs – α0 +
(α1– α2s) M with α0 ≥ α1 ≥ α2 ≥ 0, without the disease it is βθs. The formula-
tions of disease probability and second period health allow the marginal
benefit of preventive care to decrease with the initial survival probability
(hence also with the initial health).14
I assume that consumption equals a fixed income (Y) minus the expendi-
tures on preventive care (pM). Current utility is a linear function of consumption,
health, and preventive care use. The utility weights of consumption and health
are γ1 and γ2. Preventive care use is allowed to have a direct negative effect on
utility (–γ3M) due to its unpleasant nature. The second period utility is dis-
counted with a discount factor of δ. Without falling ill with the specific disease,
health deteriorates by a factor of 0 < β < 1 due to ageing.
Applying linearity assumptions makes it possible to analytically solve
the model. The implications of the model remain similar if Cobb–Douglas
utility function is applied; however, the model then can be solved only
numerically and such a solution requires further assumptions on the model
parameters.
14 π0 is the probability of getting the disease without preventive care use. This probability
decreases with π1–π2s if preventive care is used. Analogously, α0 is the health deteriorating
effect of the disease without preventive care use, which effect decreases with α1–α2s if pre-
ventive care is used.
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The maximisation problem is the following:
max
M2 0, 1f g
γ1 Y−pMð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
utility of period 1 consumption
+ γ2 θsð Þ|ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
utility of period 1 health
− γ3M|{z}
disutility of prevention
+δ s− ξMð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
survival probability
.
π0 − π1 − π2sð ÞMð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
probability of disease
γ1Y + γ2 βθs− α0 + α1 − α2sð ÞMð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
period 2 health in case of disease
0
B@
1
CA+
2
64
+ 1− π0 + π1 − π2sð ÞMð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
probability of no disease
γ1Y + γ2 βθs|{z}
period 2 health if no disease
0
B@
1
CA
3
75
[8]
I consider two types of preventive care. Type 1 care (flu vaccination) decreases the
probability of illness, but not the severity of that, thus α1 = α2 = 0. Type 2 care (cancer
screening) on the other hand does not affect the probability of illness, but decreases
the severity of that, thus π1 = π2 = 0. The following results can be derived.15
For type 1 care, M = 1 is the optimal solution if
γ1p+ γ3|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
initial cost of M
+ δξπ0α0γ2|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
health cost of unavoided disease
<
< δ s+ ξð Þα0γ2 π1 − π2sð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
health cost of disease avoided by M
+ δξ γ1Y + γ2βθs
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
value of healthy life gained through M
[9]
The right-hand side of the inequality is concave in s, and a higher initial survival
probability may make preventive care use less likely if π2 is big. Therefore, if the
marginal effect of preventive care on the probability of disease decreases with
the initial survival probability then it might not be optimal to use the preventive
service for those with the lowest and highest survival probabilities. Also, using
that s = spredlcted+ s
~
, no utilisation might be optimal for those with large negative
or positive deviations between the subjective and predicted probabilities of
survival. This result corresponds to the empirical findings on the demand for
flu vaccination. It is also in line with Grossman (1972) who state that “[his]
model does not assert that need or illness […] will definitely be positively
correlated with utilization of medical service.” If π2 were negative (implying
increasing marginal benefit of care use) then my model would unambiguously
predict the preventive care use to increase with initial survival probability.
15 Even if M is allowed to be a continuous variable with M ϵ [0,1], for both types of care the
optimisation problem is convex in M, implying that the optimal preventive care use must be a
corner solution, i. e. M = 0 or M = 1
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For type 2 care, M = 1 is the optimal solution if
γ1p+ γ3|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
initial cost of M
+ δξπ0α0γ2|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
health cost of unavoided disease
<
< δ s+ ξð Þπ0γ2 α1 − α2sð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
health cost of disease avoided by M
+ δξ γ1Y + γ2βθs
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
value of healthy life gained through M
[10]
The right-hand side of this expression is again concave in s. If the marginal
effect of preventive care on the severity of the disease decreases with the
initial survival probability (α2 ≥ 0 is not negligible) then depending on the
other parameters, no use might be the optimal solution for those with the
lowest and highest survival probabilities, and also for those with strong
negative or positive deviations between the subjective and predicted survival
probabilities.
This illustrative model suggests that the estimated negative marginal effects
of positive and negative perceptions can all be explained with a utility max-
imisation model. The empirical results indicate that the marginal benefit of flu
shot decreases with survival probability, decreasing benefits are less evident for
cancer screening. Also, the robust result that justified negative perceptions
decrease the probability of preventive care use can be the outcome of rational
decision making, as with lower survival probability the value of healthy life
gained through preventive care in eqs [9] and [10] decreases.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I analyse how preventive care use is related to the subjective
survival probability of older people in the United States. Preventive care use
might increase the expected lifetime, but the pattern of causation is more
ambiguous in the opposite direction. When making a decision on preventive
care use, one has to consider the current pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs
and the potential future benefits. The decision depends among others on the
current survival probabilities. The predictions of a model of preventive care
use strongly depend on the assumptions related to the future benefits. If, for
example, the marginal benefits are constant, then higher chances of survival
are likely to lead to higher demand for preventive care. However, if the
marginal benefits are greater for someone in bad health and with low chances
of survival then the demand for preventive care might decrease with subjective
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survival probability. In either case, the optimal decision on preventive care use
depends on the chances of survival, which policy makers should take into
account when devising preventive care programmes. Depending on the type of
the preventive service (its individual and social costs and benefits), it might
not be optimal to target people with very low or very high chances of survival,
as based on the observable characteristics. This conclusion is based on the
theoretical analysis. As an additional layer of the analysis, the empirical
findings reveal the importance of private information in subjective survival
probability.
The empirical analysis is based on the Health and Retirement Study. My
main focus is on the consequences of positive and negative deviations between
subjective and predicted (objective) chances of survival. As an extension of the
model, I also distinguish justified and unjustified deviations from the predicted
survival probability, based on later health and survival. The empirical results
suggest that the uptake of flu vaccinations and attendance of cancer screening
respond to subjective deviations from the predicted survival probability: those
who report lower probability of survival than the predicted survival probability
are less likely to utilise preventive services. If the subjective 10-year survival
probability is 10 percentage points lower than the predicted one then that
implies 0.42–0.81 percentage points lower probability of preventive care use.
There is some evidence that positive differences between the subjective and
predicted survival probabilities also imply lower likelihood of preventive care
use, but this relation is weaker in case of cancer screening. The estimation
results can be explained with the utility maximisation model with state-depen-
dent benefits of preventive care. Those who correctly foresee that their expected
remaining lifetime is much shorter or longer than what would follow from the
observable characteristics might benefit ceteris paribus less from the preventive
services because these services have little positive effect on their discounted
future utility. Specification checks suggest that the findings are mainly driven by
respondents with negative perceptions whose low expectations are justified by
later outcomes. There is no clear evidence that unjustified perceptions of survi-
val probability significantly influence the usage of preventive services by people
aged 50 and above.
Policy makers and healthcare professionals should thus aim at ensuring that
people are well informed about factors such as lifestyle and health behaviours,
medical conditions, environmental factors that can influence the chances of
survival. Healthcare professionals (general practitioners) could also discuss the
longevity perceptions with their patients, and how those influence their deci-
sions of preventive care use. The lack of accurate longevity expectations would
lead to sub-optimal decisions on preventive care use.
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Due to data limitations, the empirical investigation cannot entirely capture
the dynamic relation between survival perceptions and preventive care use.
A structural analysis of the dynamic relations remains to future research. Also,
the presented theoretical model is only illustratory. Ideally, all the parameters
and functional form specifications should be based on empirical observations,
which again has heavy data requirements.
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